



THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS
AT
AUSTIN

2020973412

DS
126.5
A53
1952

CHARGE #
110-815375-8

THE
GENERAL LIBRARIES
THE UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS
AT
AUSTIN

90



The Arabs in Israel

PUBLISHED BY THE
GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

JANUARY, 1952



ISRAEL OFFICE OF INFORMATION

THE ARABS IN ISRAEL

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Arabs of Palestine numbered at the end of 1947 approximately 1,300,000, of whom 1,170,000 were Moslems and 130,000 Christians. Of this total about 700,000 lived in the territory now constituting the State of Israel. The Christians were sub-divided into numerous communities — Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Latins, Maronites and several Protestant denominations. There were, in addition to the Arabs, small groups of religious and national minorities, such as Druzes, Circassians, Armenians, etc. According to their social status and locality, the Arabs of Palestine comprised about 850,000 villagers, 400,000 town dwellers and 50,000 to 60,000 nomads and semi-nomads (Beduin).

The average living standards of the Palestinian Arabs were rather high compared with those of the neighbouring Arab countries. Their villages prospered. Their citrus groves and other fruit plantations expanded from year to year. Even the economy of the ordinary fellah had reached some degree of modernisation. Arab commerce was ramified and well developed. It was served by two Arab national banks and by the international banks working in the country. Industry, too, was showing significant progress. Apart from the old trades and crafts, the first beginnings of a modern industrial development were discernible, especially in the textile, tobacco and building materials branches.

Health conditions were improving steadily. Infantile mortality had decreased from 186 per thousand in 1922 to 90 in 1946. The general death rate diminished correspondingly, and the expectation of life at birth was higher among Palestinian Arabs than among any other Arab community in the Middle East. The Government health services were more advanced than in the adjoining Arab countries, although the Arabs themselves showed

Published by the

ISRAEL OFFICE OF INFORMATION

New York	Washington, D. C.	Los Angeles	Montreal, Canada
11 E. 70th St.	1621—22nd St.	208 W. 8th St.	1260 University St.

This material is filed with the Department of Justice where the required registration statement, under 22 U.S.C. 611 et seq., of Israel Office of Information as an agency of the Israel Government is available for inspection. Registration does not imply approval or disapproval of this material by the United States Government.

little independent effort in this sphere. The general progress was also reflected in the educational sphere. Illiteracy decreased from year to year. The percentage of children attending elementary schools was estimated by the Mandatory authorities to average 48 percent for both sexes and 70 percent for male children — a substantially higher ratio than in the neighbouring Arab countries. Secondary schools were also comparatively well frequented, and year after year hundreds of Arab youths left Palestine for university study abroad.

This remarkable progress was due in significant degree to the sweeping advances made by the country under the impact of the Jewish effort of reconstruction. For more than six decades the Jews had been pouring their energy, skill and resources into the reclamation of their ancient land. The effect was a transformation for which there was no parallel in the Middle East. Jewish resettlement produced a growing internal market for Arab produce and brought prosperity to the fellahin who represented the mass of the population. The example of the Jewish settlers and their scientific methods had a stimulating effect on Arab farming. The work of the Jewish research institutes in the fields of animal and plant disease, the discovery of industrial uses for surplus agricultural products and the opening up by Jewish effort of new water resources gave a powerful impetus to Arab rural progress. At the same time Jewish citriculture, industry, building and import provided profitable employment to Arab labour and raised the standards of the Arab working population. The notable achievements of the Jewish labour movement acted as an incentive for Arab trade union organisation. The large Jewish contribution to the revenue enabled the Government to grant considerable tax relief to the Arab rural population and to expand the country's health, education and social services. Jewish antimalaria work and reclamation greatly benefitted the Arab population, which also was served by Jewish public health and welfare institutions all over the country. The most striking result of these developments was the steady growth of the Arab population: during the thirty years of the Mandate it increased by more than one hundred percent. "The general beneficent effect of Jewish immigration on Arab welfare", wrote the Palestine Royal Commission in 1937, "is illustrated by the fact that the increase in the Arab population is most marked in urban areas affected by Jewish development." (p. 129).

The significant economic and cultural progress thus made by the Arabs of Palestine during the Mandatory era failed, however, to mitigate in the slightest degree their bitter hostility to Jewish immigration and development activities to which these achievements were due in such large measure. This hostility, which found expression in violent agitation, in boycott campaigns and in repeated murderous outbreaks against the Jewish population, became the dominant feature of the country's political life and monopolised public and social forces in the Arab community. Arabs who aspired to a peaceful accord between the two peoples were few and lacked the vigour to render their efforts effective. So intense, indeed, was the general atmosphere of hostility that even those seeking an agreed solution could voice their views only behind closed doors while publicly endorsing the nationalist programme.

Political control finally became concentrated in the hands of the Arab Higher Committee, which enjoyed undisputed authority among the Arabs inside Palestine and the support of the League outside. The chairmanship of the Committee was reserved for the absent "Leader", the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini. After having been a close collaborator of Hitler during the World War, Haj Amin managed in 1946 to find shelter and establish his headquarters in Cairo. The more important members of the Arab Higher Committee were Jamal al-Husseini, Dr. Hussein al-Khalidi, Ahmed Hilmi Pasha and Emil Ghoury. The Committee succeeded during the final phase in merging the two para-military formations, Al-Futuwa and An-Najjada, into the militant "Organisation of Arab Youth" which constituted the spearhead of the subsequent Arab onslaught on the Jews.

Such in brief was the position of the Arabs of Palestine when the General Assembly of the United Nations, by its resolution of 29 November 1947, recommended the establishment in Palestine of two independent States, one Jewish and one Arab. Had the Arabs accepted and implemented the decision, they would have secured sovereign control of half the country, could all have remained in their homes and would have obtained a major share of the material benefits accruing from the proposed Economic Union with the Jewish State. This, however, was not to be. No sooner was the decision of the General Assembly announced than the Arabs utterly rejected it and rose in arms against their Jewish

neighbours. The Arab Higher Committee led the campaign with the active and passive support of the mass of the Arab population. The members of the Committee who resided in Cairo and Damascus took charge of finance, supplies and equipment as well as of liaison with the Arab League and the several Arab States. Those who remained in Jerusalem assumed the strategic and tactical direction of operations, the distribution of the equipment and funds received from the Arab countries, the deployment of forces and the execution of the directives received from Cairo and Damascus. The top commanders in the field were Abd al-Kader al-Husseini in the district of Jerusalem and Hassan Salama in the Jaffa-Ramle region. In the north, where no local leader emerged, command was taken over by Fawzi al-Qawuqji from Syria, who placed himself at the head of the so-called "Liberation Army" consisting of volunteers from Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon.

THE WAR AGAINST ISRAEL

In the Arab-Israel war, four principal phases may be distinguished. In all except the last, that of the invasion of Palestine by the armies of the neighbouring States, the Arabs of Palestine took the leading part.

From December 1947 to January 1948 the Arab campaign took the form of sporadic guerilla activities reminiscent of the disturbances of 1936-39. There were hit and run attacks on isolated Jewish settlements and town quarters and on Jewish road transport. There was looting and burning of Jewish property, shops and warehouses situated in Arab quarters. This phase of operations was conducted entirely by Palestinian Arabs, though part of the financial resources and military equipment came from the neighbouring Arab countries. The Arab population also provided the fighters with shelter, food and weapons. Gradually the conflict grew in scope and intensity. It became unsafe for any Jew to leave the Jewish areas. All over the country attacks on Jewish highway traffic, villages and town quarters became the order of the day. The Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road, the border zone between Jaffa and Tel Aviv, the Jewish sections of Haifa and the isolated agricultural outposts in the Negev became principal targets. Jewish road transport was ambushed with heavy loss of life. Access to the Jewish

Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem and to the University and the Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus was rendered unsafe. Shooting on the borders of Jewish settlement areas became continuous and took a heavy toll. Soon the fighting came to engulf also the Valley of Jesreel and the Jewish sections of Galilee and the Jordan Valley. Within a few weeks the whole country was reduced to a state of general warfare.

The campaign was marked from the very beginning by a quite unprecedented intensity and violence. The aim was not merely to win a military and political victory over the Jews, but to wipe out or eject the entire Jewish population. It was a war *à l'outrance*, in which all sections of the Arab community took part. A statement made at a press conference by Azzam Pasha, the Secretary General of the Arab League, on 15 May 1948, the eve of the general invasion, gave forcible expression to the general character and aim of the offensive: "This", he said, "will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades". (B.B.C. news broadcast). Similar utterances abounded in the Arab press and in broadcasts from Arab countries. Arab guerilla forces showed from the outset barbarous cruelty and an utter disregard of the rules of war. They took no prisoners. If a Jewish force was outnumbered, it was annihilated to the last man. The wounded were frequently maimed and left to die on the battlefield. The dead were mutilated in the most revolting fashion. Photographs of mutilated bodies were reproduced in albums and sold in the streets of Jerusalem. In an interview which Fawzi al-Qawuqji gave to a representative of the Paris "Le Monde", he frankly admitted that the Arabs showed no consideration for the rules of war. "The Jews cannot be regarded as a nation like the Americans or Chinese; they are highway robbers to whom international rules of law do not apply". (Cited in "as-Sarih", 16 February 1948). Any Jewish village or town quarter which in the course of this war came to be occupied by Arab forces, such as the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem, the villages of the Kfar Etzion bloc to the south and of Ataroth and Neve Yaacov to the north of Jerusalem, and the settlement of Beit Haarava at the northern end of the Dead Sea, were wiped out of existence. The Resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947 had envisaged that after the partition of Palestine there would

be Arabs in the Jewish, and Jews in the Arab State. There are at present 170,000 Arabs living in the State of Israel. There is not a single Jew left in any part of Palestine that fell under Arab control.

The second phase of the Arab attack against the Jews began in February 1948 when the Arab "Liberation Army" invaded Palestine from the north. This force consisted to a considerable extent of Palestinian Arabs who had crossed into Syria and the Lebanon, there to receive their military training. Nor could the "Liberation Army" have operated in the wide area from the Lebanese border to the vicinity of Nablus, in which it exercised control, without the active cooperation and support of the local Arab population. The arrival of the "Liberation Army" gave new impetus and strength to the Arab campaign. Local guerillas commanded by Syrian officers made constant attacks on Jewish settlements in Galilee, in the Sharon and in the Jerusalem area, some of which assumed the form of well planned military operations in which artillery was for the first time used against the Jews.

The third phase, from the end of March to the 15th May 1948 — when the British Mandate terminated and the State of Israel was proclaimed — witnessed the main large-scale combat between the Arabs of Palestine and its Jews. It included the fight for the Jerusalem highway, culminating in the conquest by the Jews of Castel Hill (April 9th), the battles of Mishmar Haemek (April 7th) and Ramat Yohanan (April 12th), the occupation by Jewish forces of Tiberias (April 18th), Haifa (April 22nd), Safed (May 10th), Jaffa (May 13th) and Acre (May 18th). It was this phase which marked the end of the fighting effort of the Palestinian Arabs and created the situation encountered by the Arab armies of invasion. For what these forces found on entering the country was not a fighting Arab citizenry, but — with the exception of the rump of the "Liberation Army" — scattered remnants of an abandoned flock. The fact that the civil and military leaders were the first to flee and to abandon the population to its fate played a decisive part in the Arab debacle.

THE ARAB EXODUS

The first and foremost result of the mass hysteria that seized the Arab population as the breakdown and disintegration of their fighting

forces and the desertion of their leadership became evident, was a stream of refugees leaving the country. About 30,000, mostly of the well-to-do classes, but also villagers in the Sharon, had left the country during the first phase of the disturbances to wait in safety until the storm blew over, as they had done in the troubled years of 1936/39. By the beginning of April, 1948, the flight had assumed mass proportions, the number of emigrés being estimated at over 130,000. In May, Faris al-Khoury, the Syrian delegate at the United Nations, was speaking already of 250,000.

The exodus was the result in the first place of fear and of the despair caused by the debacle. The Arabs had hoped not merely to inflict a crushing defeat upon the Jews, but to liquidate them completely and loot their possessions. It was understandable that the average Arab, knowing what he had intended to do to his Jewish neighbour, should expect that the victorious Jew would mete out a similar fate to him. Apart from this general fear, there was the not unnatural apprehension of individual retaliation. Such terrible things had been done that not a few felt uneasy at the prospect of impending retribution. The one and single instance of Jewish atrocity, the destruction of the Arab village of Deir Yassin by a group of Jewish extremists acting throughout in defiance of the Jewish national and military authorities and sternly disowned by the organised Jewish community, added fuel to the flames, the more so as it was mercilessly exploited by the Arab press and broadcasts — a tragic illustration of the boomerang effect of Arab propaganda on their own people.

The second cause was the direct orders issued to the population by the Arab Higher Committee and military commanders to leave the country in anticipation of the invasion of the Arab armies. They were warned to keep out of harm's way and promised that they would return within a short time in the wake of the victorious Arab forces, to regain possession of their belongings and secure in addition a handsome share in the expected war booty. They were warned at the same time that anyone staying on behind and submitting to Jewish rule would be regarded as a traitor and appropriately punished once victory was achieved.

Most of the fugitives were firmly convinced that they would return within a very short time. This is borne out by innumerable comments in the Arab press and radio broadcasts. An interview given by the Arab Greek Catholic Archbishop of Galilee, Msgr.

George Hakim, to the Lebanese "Sada al-Janub" on 16 August 1948 may be quoted as an illustration. "The refugees," the Archbishop said, "had been confident that their absence from Palestine would not last long, that they would return within a few days — within a week or two. Their leaders had promised them that the Arab armies would crush the 'Zionist gangs' very quickly and that there was no need for panic or fear of a long exile." In much the same way Emil Ghoury, the Secretary of the Arab Higher Committee, writing in the Beirut "Telegraph" of 6 August 1948, frankly placed the responsibility for the Arab mass flight on the Arab Governments. "The fact," he wrote, "that there are these refugees is the direct consequence of the Arab States being in opposition to partition and to the Jewish State, and they must share in the solution of this problem. It is inconceivable that the refugees should be sent back to their homes while they are occupied by the Jews. . . . The very proposal is an evasion of responsibility on the part of those responsible. It would serve as a first step towards Arab recognition of the State of Israel and of partition. Indeed, many people regard this as evidence of an intention on the part of those responsible to evade taking the necessary action for the rescue of Palestine."

Habib Issa, editor of "Al-Huda," the principal Lebanese newspaper in the United States, writing on June 8th, 1951, on "The Arab League and the Palestine refugees," stated: "The Secretary-General of the Arab League, Abd ar-Rahman Azzam Pasha, published numerous declarations assuring the Arab peoples and all others that the occupation of Palestine and of Tel Aviv would be as simple as a military promenade for the Arab armies. Azzam Pasha's statements pointed out that armies were already on the frontiers and that all the millions that the Jews had spent on land and on economic development would surely be easy booty for the Arabs, since it would be a simple matter to throw the Jews to the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea. As the time for the British withdrawal drew nearer, the zeal of the Arab League was redoubled. . . . *Brotherly advice was given to the Arabs of Palestine, urging them to leave their land, homes and property and go to stay temporarily in neighbouring, brotherly States, lest the guns of the invading Arab armies mow them down.* The Palestinian Arabs had no choice but to obey the 'advice' of the League and to believe what Azzam Pasha and other responsible men in the League told them — that their with-

drawal from their lands and their country was only temporary and would end in a few days with the successful termination of the Arab 'punishment' action against Israel."

It was in vain that the Jewish authorities, civil and military, pleaded with the Arab population to stop their panic flight. Indeed, from the beginning of the disturbances every effort had been made by the Jewish public bodies, national and local, to maintain peaceful relations with the Arabs. Since early in December 1947 leaflets were distributed in Arab villages and towns urging the people to maintain the peace and not allow themselves to be swayed by war-mongers into hostile acts against their Jewish neighbours. Broadcasts in the same vein were sent out almost daily in Arabic by the Jewish radio station. The Arabic press of those days bears witness to the fact that these broadcasts were listened to by many thousands of Palestinian Arabs. In almost every resolution adopted during those critical months by the Jewish Agency, the "Vaad Leumi" (General Council of Palestine Jews) and the Jewish municipalities and local councils, there were urgent pleas to the Arabs to restore the peace and stay in their homes on terms of good neighbourliness.

When the exodus began, the Jewish community councils of Tiberias, Haifa, Safed and other places affected addressed urgent appeals to the panic-stricken population not to leave. A report by a high British police officer in Haifa to Police Headquarters of the Mandatory Administration in Jerusalem of 26 April 1948 states: "Every effort is being made by the Jews to persuade the Arab populace to stay and carry on with their normal lives, to get their shops and businesses open and to be assured that their lives and interests will be safe." Two days later the same source reported: "The Jews are still making every effort to persuade the Arab populace to remain and settle back in their normal lives in the town."* All these pleas proved ineffective as the Arab press and broadcasting stations warned the Arab population not to believe the assurances of the Jewish authorities and not to give heed to their appeals to remain in the country. Perhaps the most striking illustration of Arab evacuation by peremptory command was the Arab exodus from Haifa. On April 21st, 1948, the local Arab leaders of Haifa concluded a truce with

* Reproduced photostatically in "The Army of Israel" by Moshe Pearlman, Philosophical Library, New York, 1950, p. 116.

the Jewish authorities and defence forces. By its terms the Arab population was to continue its normal life in the city. The Arab Higher Committee, however, did not permit this truce to be implemented, as it implied Arab recognition of Jewish authority, and under its pressure the Haifa Arab leaders were compelled to reverse their decision, disavow their signatures and order the immediate evacuation of Haifa by all its Arab inhabitants.**

This is how the London "Economist" of October 2nd, 1948, quoting a British eye-witness, described what happened in Haifa in those fateful days: "During subsequent days the Jewish authorities, who were now in complete control of Haifa (save for limited districts still held by the British troops), urged all Arabs to remain in Haifa and guaranteed them protection and security. As far as I know, most of the British civilian residents whose advice was asked by Arab friends told the latter that they would be wise to stay. However, of the 62,000 Arabs who formerly lived in Haifa, not more than 5,000 or 6,000 remained. . . . Various factors influenced their decision to seek safety in flight. There is but little doubt that the most potent of these factors were the announcements made over the air by the Arab Higher Executive, urging all Arabs in Haifa to quit. The reason given was that upon the final withdrawal of the British, the combined armies of the Arab States would invade Palestine and "drive the Jews into the sea," and it was clearly intimated that those Arabs who remained in Haifa and accepted Jewish protection would be regarded as renegades."

Not all groups of the Arab population acted upon the misguided advice of the Arab Higher Committee and its commanders. A number of Arab villages and semi-nomadic tribes who had made their peace with the Israel authorities and defence forces remained in their settlements. One of these groups, the tribe of al-Heib in north-eastern Galilee, even joined the Israel forces and constituted themselves a cavalry unit fighting the invading "Liberation Army." Another Mos-

** On the Jewish conquest of Haifa the British High Commissioner reported as follows to the Colonial Secretary: "The Jewish attack in Haifa was a direct consequence of continuous attacks by Arabs on Jews over the previous four days. The attack was carried out by the Hagana and there was no massacre." ("Palestine Post," 25 April 1948). A statement in similar terms was made by Sir Alexander Cadogan in the Security Council on 23 April 1948. (Security Council, Official Records, No. 62, p. 9.)

lem group, belonging to the Ahmadiya (Qadhiani) community, also abstained from taking part in the hostilities against Israel, remaining in the country and continuing their religious and cultural activities under the new conditions. Of the Druze community, numbering 15,000 souls, not a single one left the country. They all maintained friendly relations with their Jewish neighbours and accepted the State of Israel at an early date. They, too, raised units to join the Jewish Defence against Qawuqji's forces. Of the Arab Christians — even though they were for the most part town-dwellers and the townspeople were in general the first to flee — a much smaller percentage emigrated than of the Moslems. While of the approximately 630,000 Moslems who lived in 1947 in the area now constituting the territory of Israel about 500,000 (i.e. 80 percent) left their homes, only about 35,000 to 40,000 Christians (i.e. half of the 70,000 living in the area) became refugees. The remainder stayed behind as citizens of Israel.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR

When the clouds of war had lifted, the new Government of Israel, in approaching the problem presented by the Arab minority in its territory, found itself faced with a situation of bewildering complexity. The Arabs who remained in the country had suffered a profound psychological upheaval as well as a fundamental dislocation of their social and economic life. Many villages had been badly damaged during the fighting. Agricultural implements and machinery, stock, seeds, etc., had been destroyed. Nearly all the great landowners and most of the wealthy peasants, the semi-feudal leaders and influential families to whom the average peasant had looked for support and guidance in his day-to-day social and economic life, had fled. The old markets and trade customs had gone. The Arab countryside had shrunk and its relationship with the centres of urban life had been completely transformed.

The position in the towns was even more disastrous. Whereas the villager who stayed on had at least kept his land and could start afresh, the townsman who remained behind found himself deprived of the whole basis of his material existence. Landlords had lost their tenants; bankers, businessmen and lawyers, their clientele; clerks and Government officials, their jobs.

But the collapse was not confined merely to the economic foundations of Arab society. The whole social fabric of Arab life had fallen apart. The old parties, societies, clubs and newspapers had vanished overnight. The political and municipal leaders had left and none had taken their place. More fundamental still, the shock of finding themselves utterly defeated and reduced to the position of an uneasy minority had thoroughly unhinged Arab mentality. The military collapse had also produced an acute moral crisis. It had proved to the Arab population that they had been misled by their leaders and abandoned by them in the hour of their direst need. The result was a bitter disillusionment and a general apathy towards everything political. Resentment against their former leaders did not, however, make the Arab population more friendly disposed towards Israel. The new State was regarded with deep suspicion, not infrequently with violent hatred. It could hardly be otherwise. Hatred for everything Jewish had been preached for so long that it could scarcely be thrown off at one stroke. Sullen and embittered, the Arab remnant faced the new situation. None knew what the morrow held in store. Moreover, many still refused to believe that the new State of Israel had come to stay. The threats of a "second round" heard day after day in the broadcasts from the neighbouring countries were hardly designed to reconcile them to the new regime. As long as the Arab States refused to recognize Israel and openly proclaimed that they were still at war with Israel, the average Arab inhabitant could scarcely be expected to settle down under the new conditions, for to do so might expose him to the charge of treachery when the Arab armies came to recapture the country. The dilemma was all the more acute as these threats came from the most authoritative leaders of the Arab States, members of government and high army officers. Mohammed Salah ad-Din Pasha, the present Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, for instance, declared in an article in "al-Misri," leading Egyptian daily, on 11 October, 1949, that the United Nations Resolution then adopted on the return of the refugees conflicted with the earlier United Nations Resolution on the partition of Palestine and the establishment of the State of Israel. A prerequisite for the return of the refugees, he said, is "the complete expulsion of Israel from Palestine." He added:

"Let it therefore be known and appreciated that in demanding the restoration of the refugees to Palestine, the Arabs intend that they

return as the masters of the homeland and not as slaves. More explicitly: they intend to annihilate the State of Israel."

Not infrequently these inciting articles and broadcasts referred specifically to the Arabs in Israel who were assigned the task of a fifth column in the coming war of revenge. Thus, for example, the Lebanese "As-Sayyad" of April 6th, 1950, in advocating, as an initial stratagem, Arab recognition of the State of Israel, declared that by such recognition

"the return of all the refugees to their homes would be secured. Thereby we should, on the one hand, eliminate the refugee problem and, on the other, create a large Arab majority that would serve as the most effective means of reviving the Arab character of Palestine while forming a powerful fifth column for the day of revenge and reckoning."

It was under such conditions that the State of Israel had to find ways and means of integrating its Arab population. It had to do so at a time when the war against Israel was either still raging or merely adjourned *sine die*, and when after actual fighting had ceased on the conclusion of armistice agreements, the obstinate refusal of the Arab States to enter into any peace negotiations lent ominous weight to the threats of a coming second round. Under such conditions, considerations of security and self-preservation inevitably dominated the Israel approach to the Arab problem. It was clearly not safe to lift security restrictions on Arab movement in the border areas or extend facilities for the return of Arab émigrés while the danger of a resumption of war was ever present and real: it was difficult to find ways of reconstituting Arab economic life as long as the Arab population itself was not yet prepared to accept the new order. The complexity of the issue was further aggravated by the acute problem of Arab marauders and robber gangs constantly infiltrating across Israel's frontiers. For some considerable time past groups of such infiltrators have continually been entering Israel territory, at times almost in nightly succession. Many of them were armed, some clearly directed by outside agencies. They have left a trail of blood and pillage in almost every frontier region. According to official statistics, up to June, 1951, eighty-six inhabitants of Israel — apart from Israel military personnel — were murdered by these gangs, and a large number wounded. Property to an estimated value of half a million pounds was stolen or destroyed. Up to March, 1951, 1,369 illegal entrants had been arrested by the Israel police,

but these represented only a small fraction of the total. It is clear that these large and continual incursions could not have been carried out without the active aid of Arabs in Israel.

Not all infiltrators came with criminal intentions. Many entered the country with a view to settling there. Nearly 24,000 Arabs who crossed into Israel territory were allowed to remain and were legalised as citizens of Israel. An additional 18,000 are estimated to be illegally resident in the country. There are further some 20,000 Arabs who during the hostilities moved to areas which were then outside the control of Israel, and were overtaken by the advancing Israel forces. The majority of these refugees have been offered resettlement by the Government of Israel with the help of U.N. relief agencies, though they cannot always be re-established in the same places where they lived formerly. Steps are also about to be taken to regularise the proprietary rights of those Arabs who because of the vicissitudes of war moved from their former villages to other places in Israel.

But it was not only political and security considerations which hampered the reintegration of the Arab population in the new economic and social structure. The task was further complicated by the almost complete disappearance of any effective Arab leadership. When the Israel authorities came to reorganize Arab education, health and welfare services, and to provide for the religious needs of the Moslem population, they were faced with an acute shortage of competent Arab personnel. The position was all the more difficult as the Arabs of Palestine had never in the past shown much initiative in organising their social services, and had relied on the Mandatory Government to provide for their needs. Under the new conditions any return to the patterns of colonial administration was clearly ruled out. Limited though the available personnel might be, the Israel authorities had to rely upon Arab cooperation to resuscitate Arab economic, educational and social life. It is against this complex background that Israel's efforts in this most difficult and delicate sphere must be assessed.

RECONSTRUCTION

The present non-Jewish population of Israel numbers approximately 170,000. Of these 119,000 are Moslems, 35,000 Christians and

15,000 Druzes. According to their regional distribution, they consist of approximately 32,000 town dwellers, 120,000 villagers and 18,000 nomads.

RURAL LIFE.

From the very beginning, the Government made special efforts to promote Arab farming and reconstruct the economy of the fellahin, who had suffered acutely from the ravages of war. Apart from the general assistance accorded by the Government to all farmers in Israel by the grant of subventions, the distribution of seeds, the loan of tractors, the extension of irrigation networks and agricultural instruction, the Ministry of Agriculture granted special loans to Arab farmers without guarantee to enable them to replenish their stock and accelerate the transition to more intensive farming. During the first two years of the State, an amount of IL. 183,000 was allotted to Arab farmers for these purposes. The estimates for 1951/52 provide for similar loans totalling IL. 200,000. The result of these measures has been to enlarge the areas under cultivation and irrigation, to improve agricultural methods and to introduce new crops in the Arab agricultural sector. The Arab area under dry farming increased from 143,000 dunams in 1948/49 to 453,000 dunams in 1949/50, that under vegetables from 18,000 in 1948/49 to 39,000 in 1949/50 and 45,000 dunams in 1950/51, that under tobacco from 6,400 dunams in 1948/49 to 26,000 in 1949/50 and 48,000 in 1950/51. There were similar increases in the areas of pulse and melon cultivation. Vegetable growing on irrigated land increased from 2,500 dunams in 1948/49 to 6,800 dunams in 1950/51. In the area occupied by the Beduin tribes in the Negev, State aid was also given on a considerable scale in the form of agricultural loans and the provision of employment in public works. During the severe drought of 1950/51, financial assistance was accorded to various tribes to alleviate their distress.

Special efforts have been made to encourage the formation of cooperative associations. Up to the summer of 1951, 85 Arab cooperatives had been established. This total includes 21 agricultural marketing cooperatives, with an average membership of 75; 13 consumers' cooperatives with a membership of 55—60; 8 tobacco growing cooperatives and a number of smaller associations. The Jewish Federation of Labour has spent considerable sums on fostering the

growth of an Arab cooperative movement and in this connection has founded a "Workers and Peasants Fund" ("Sanduq al-Ummal wal-Fallahin") with a capital of IL. 100,000 to promote economic, and in particular cooperative, enterprise among the Arab peasantry. The number of cooperatives established with such aid amounted to 23, with a total membership of 900.

URBAN CONDITIONS.

Problems in the towns were far harder to solve. The remaining Arab skilled workers, artisans, dock and railway workers, drivers, etc., had comparatively little difficulty in adapting themselves to new conditions. Wages of such workers are going up progressively and are at present higher than in any other Middle Eastern country. For skilled and many unskilled workers full equality of wages with Jewish labour has been achieved. Where Arab workers are still employed at lower wages — e.g. in particular those employed by Arab firms — the Government and the Jewish Federation of Labour are working towards the goal of full equality and the trend in this direction is unmistakable. On the other hand, those strata of the Arab urban population whose economic existence was previously based on the presence of a populous Arab community had to seek other modes of employment. Every effort was made by the Israel authorities to find employment for former government clerks. Teachers and religious officials, too, have for the most part been reinstated.

HEALTH

Hospital facilities, clinics and out-patient departments, as well as medical treatment, are available in Israel to all inhabitants without distinction. There is no separate Arab health service, but the Health Ministry devotes special attention to the needs of the Arab community. In 1951, it maintained twenty-nine clinics in Arab areas, four of them mobile clinics and two serving especially the Beduin tribes in the Negev. Hospital facilities in the Arab areas comprised 365 beds, but Arabs are, of course, also admitted to the general hospitals. Apart from the medical facilities provided by the Government, the extensive services of the "Kupat Holim," the Sick Fund of the Jewish Federation of Labour, are available to the Arab members of the Federation (numbering approximately 11,000) and to their families.

SOCIAL WELFARE

Shortly after the conclusion of hostilities, social welfare activities were begun in the Arab areas. Offices, now numbering twelve, were set up in Nazareth, Acre, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle and in Arab villages of Eastern and Western Galilee. As hardly any qualified Arab social welfare workers were available, special courses were organized for training Arab personnel. All the graduates of these courses are now employed by the Ministry for Social Welfare. The assistance rendered includes the distribution of food, clothing and footwear and the care of babies, adolescents, aged, sick and disabled persons. The Ministry operates twenty food centres in Arab villages at which 3,000 children receive meals. In a number of places courses for needlework, basket weaving and raffia work have been organised. In Acre an old age home has been established. From December, 1948 to March, 1951 the Ministry spent IL. 66,863 on Arab welfare work.

EDUCATION

The amount spent by the Government of Israel on the education of Arab children amounted in each of the fiscal years of 1948/49 and 1949/50 to approximately IL. 200,000, and in the fiscal year 1951/52 to about IL. 266,000. While the Jewish population had been used during the Mandatory era to maintain its school system largely by its own efforts, the Arab community had in this respect depended mainly on the Government and on the foreign missions. It was difficult for the Israel authorities to wean the Arab population of these long engrained habits. Under the Israel "Compulsory Education Act, 1949," the local authorities are required to bear a certain part of the education budget, in the main the cost of the provision and maintenance of school buildings. The Arab villages and municipalities at first complied very inadequately with this requirement of the law, and the Government of Israel had to spend large sums on Arab elementary education, involving an average expenditure per child which was considerably higher than the corresponding outlay for Jewish schools. There has, however, been a notable improvement in this respect in the course of the past two years.

In spite of some initial difficulties, Arab elementary education in Israel has made remarkable progress. While the number of Arab

schools was in December 1948 only 46 with 186 teachers and 7,147 pupils, the corresponding figures for the end of the scholastic year 1950/51 were 102 schools, 628 teachers and about 26,000 pupils. Among the latter there were about 8,700 girls. These figures refer only to the Government schools. In addition, there are about 40 private schools, mainly maintained by foreign missions and church institutions, with approximately 4,500 Arab pupils. The total thus amounts to about 140 schools and 30,000 pupils. The increase in the number of State-maintained Arab schools from the end of 1948 to the summer of 1951 amounts to 122 percent, that in the number of teachers to 238 percent, and that in the number of pupils to 240 percent. While under the Mandatory regime there was one pupil for every fifteen Arab inhabitants, the ratio in Israel is now one for every six and a half. It will be recalled that the percentage of school-age children actually receiving education was 48 percent at the end of the Mandatory era. It is now 71 percent, if the settled Arab population is taken into account, and 67 percent if the Beduin population is included.* The Government of Israel has opened new elementary schools in 35 Arab villages which had no schools at all under the former regime.

A further notable advance in the educational sphere has been the introduction of modern methods of tuition in the place of the old-fashioned and rigid system which formerly governed Arab education. Another innovation is the institution of the kindergarten, which was formerly almost unknown to the mass of the Arab population. At present 4,253 Arab children attend State-maintained kindergartens. The period of elementary school education, which was formerly from the ages of six to twelve, has been lengthened, downwards to the age of five and upwards to thirteen. A marked change has been wrought in the realm of girls' education. Formerly, girls formed only 20 percent of the Arab school children; the proportion has now risen to 34 percent. The Ministry of Education is continuing its endeavours to induce Arab parents to send their girls to school.

One of the most revolutionary changes has been the introduction of co-education. Contrary to expectation, this has aroused little oppo-

* The corresponding percentages for the neighboring Arab countries are — Egypt: 47.4 percent; Iraq: 20 percent; Syria: 39.4 percent; Transjordan: 28 percent.

sition on the part of Arab parents. Another important reform has been the abolition of corporal punishment in the schools.

In the sphere of secondary education, progress was more difficult. The Israel Education Act does not apply to secondary schools. The aim of the State is, for the time being, to provide all children, Jewish and Arab, with a sound primary education. Secondary schools are left to private or municipal enterprise or to the collective endeavour of interested parents. The creation of Arab secondary schools depends, therefore, upon the initiative of the Arab population itself. Jewish secondary schools are open to Arab pupils with a sufficient knowledge of the Hebrew language, and a number of Arab boys have availed themselves of this opportunity. The Government is encouraging the establishment of Arab secondary schools by opening extension classes which are attached to elementary schools. It has also instituted a special matriculation examination for Arab students with Arabic and Arab literature as main subjects of examination. About ten Arab students have enrolled in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

The Government has further set up evening classes for Arab working boys. In 1951 such classes were attached to eight elementary schools and were attended by about 400 students.

The progress of Arab education in Israel is greatly hampered by the shortage of trained teachers. Pending the establishment of an Arab Teachers' Seminary, for which plans are ready, preparatory courses have been organised for the training of Arab school teachers. In these 107 teachers, male and female, have to date received a basic training. Nearly all the graduates of these courses are at present teaching in Arab elementary schools.

CULTURAL ACTIVITIES

"Kol Israel," the Israel broadcasting station, maintains an Arabic service. It broadcasts daily for one and three quarter hours in three sessions — morning, noon and evening. The broadcasts include three news bulletins, weekly talks on current events, press reviews and summaries of proceedings in parliament, as well as lectures on popular and scientific subjects. A special half hour a day is allotted to programmes for Arab women. Arab music and songs make up a substantial part of the programme. "Kol Israel" also broadcasts greetings from Arabs in Israel to their relatives abroad. It is the

only Arabic broadcasting station which regularly gives talks also in colloquial Arabic. Eight minutes on the morning of each weekday and fifteen minutes each Friday morning are devoted to a recital of chapters from the Koran. On Sunday, Christian services are broadcast. Special religious broadcasts are also made on Moslem and Christian holidays, and not infrequently the service is relayed directly from the mosque or the church. A considerable extension of these Arabic services is planned in the near future. A central Arabic library has been set up in Jaffa which contains more than 80,000 volumes and many valuable old manuscripts. The Ministry for Religious Affairs has salvaged a great number of Arabic manuscripts and documents, which have been handed over to the Jaffa Moslem community.

The Arab press of Israel consists of one daily newspaper and two weeklies. Some of the Arab newspapers which during the Mandatory era appeared in what is now Israel, migrated to the Kingdom of Jordan. Others ceased to exist. Most of the professional Arab journalists left the country.

RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

The departure of the upper strata of Arab society during the period of hostilities has also affected Arab religious life and institutions. Together with the rest, most of the ecclesiastical personnel of the Moslem community — muftis, qadhis (religious judges), preachers, prayer leaders and teachers in religious institutions — left the country. The Government of Israel thus found itself faced with the difficult task of providing religious facilities for its Moslem citizens. The Arab inhabitants themselves showed as little initiative in this sphere as in those of health and education. A special Department for the Moslem and Druze communities was set up in the Ministry for Religious Affairs. In spite of considerable difficulties this Department has succeeded in re-establishing Moslem religious life, in reorganising the Moslem religious courts, which are invested with jurisdiction in all matters of personal status, and in making available the funds of Moslem endowments (waqfs) for the maintenance of Moslem religious institutions. In the summer of 1951, there officiated in Israel 4 Moslem qadhis, 12 officials of the Moslem Religious Courts, 33 registrars of marriages, 70 imams (prayer leaders), 6 preachers, 30 muezzins, 18 mosque beadles and gardeners,

16 watchmen and 4 clerks. The total of the Moslem religious officials in Israel amounted in the summer of 1951 to 193, all paid by the Government or out of the proceeds of the Waqf administration. The Ministry for Religious Affairs has furthermore broken new ground by setting up two lay councils of the Moslem community who enjoy a wide measure of autonomy in the administration of Moslem religious concerns. Further such councils are now in the course of formation. The Ministry also employs a number of Moslem officials on its permanent staff. It has further set up a special section for the preservation of Moslem religious buildings and published a comprehensive report on this subject.

The religious life of the Christian Arabs was much less affected by the war and the Arab exodus than that of the Moslems, as most of the Christian Churches always maintained their own staff and institutions. The fact that a number of Christian denominations were led by non-Arab clergy facilitated the uninterrupted maintenance of religious services. Moreover, as previously stated, the proportion of Arab Christians who left the country was considerably less than that of the Moslem Arabs, with the result that the day-to-day life of the Christian community has been less disturbed. The Ministry for Religious Affairs maintains a Department for Christian Affairs, which works in close contact with the heads of the various denominations.

STATE AID TO ARAB SERVICES

The Budget of the State of Israel draws no distinction between the Jewish and Arab sectors of the population. Yet, apart from the general items which benefit equally all inhabitants of the country, there are a number of specific budgetary provisions for Arab needs, such as IL. 26,000 for Moslem and IL. 15,000 for Christian religious purposes, IL. 30,000 for special public works undertaken to provide employment for Arab villagers during the severe drought of last winter and IL. 60,000 for public works in the Beduin areas of the Negev. In the Estimates for 1949/50 a separate allocation of IL. 110,000 was included for Arab education. In fact, approximately IL. 200,000 was spent during that year for this purpose. In the Estimates for 1950/51 provision for Arab education was included in the general Education Estimate. It amounted to IL. 265,000. There are also special allocations for additional welfare work in

Arab villages and grants-in-aid to Arab municipalities and local councils.

PUBLIC AND INSTITUTIONAL LIFE

Arabs in Israel have thus far shown little initiative in the sphere of public activities. The old parties, societies, clubs and newspapers have practically all vanished, and the vacuum has not yet been filled. The leading personalities who remained in the country have lost a great deal of their former influence and hardly appear in public save as holders of municipal office. The only exception to the general political indifference and apathy in the Arab camp is represented by the Communists, who are active and vocal. As they did not oppose partition and the establishment of the State of Israel, they are able to claim that they had no share in the disastrous nationalist policies of the orthodox Arab leadership. There is no separate Arab Communist party, but the Arabs exercise considerable influence in the unified Israel Communist Party. Arab votes cast for the Communist list represented 22 percent of the Arab total in the general election of February 1949 and 16.6 percent in the general election of July 1951. Out of a total number of 120 members (112 Jews and 8 Arabs) of the present Knesset (Israel Parliament), there are 5 Communists (3 Jews and 2 Arabs).

The total number of Arab deputies has increased from 3 in the first Knesset to 8 in the second. Altogether, about 70,000 Arabs voted in the second general election, representing 83 percent of those on the register — a higher rate of participation than among Jews. The Arab women in Israel are the only Arab women anywhere in the Middle East who have ever gone to the polls.

Not all Arabs voted for Arab candidates, though most of them did. Of the eight Arabs elected, two are Communists (both Christian), one (also a Christian) was returned on the list of Mapam (left-wing Socialist party), and five (two Moslems, one Christian and two Druzes) represent between them three Arab groups which generally support Mapai (the Israel Labour Party, main pillar of the present Coalition Government).

In the Knesset, Arab members speak, as a rule, in Arabic, and a verbatim translation of their speeches into Hebrew follows immediately, while all Hebrew speeches are simultaneously translated into Arabic and picked up by the Arab members through earphones.

In general, Arabic enjoys virtually the status of an official language, Hebrew being the State language. Coins, postage stamps and banknotes have Arabic, in addition to Hebrew, inscriptions. The Official Gazette, in which laws and ordinances are published, appears in Arabic as well as in Hebrew. In the Arab districts all official notices are issued in Arabic. Arabs are free to address Government Departments and plead in courts in their own language. Arabic is the medium of instruction in all State-maintained Arab schools.

There now exist a number of non-political Arab organisations in Israel: youth movements, women's societies and sports clubs, as well as several organisations established by churches and religious bodies. Their number amounted in 1951 to approximately seventy. None of these groups plays any significant part in the public life of the country. The only exceptions are the two trade union organisations: the "Labour League," affiliated with the Jewish Federation of Labour and comprising 34 branches with approximately 11,000 permanent paying members, including 800 women; and the communistically inclined "Arab Workers Congress" with 22 branches and a membership estimated at 2,500. A third Arab trade union, "Ar-Rabita" (the League), founded at the end of 1948 in Nazareth, mainly by Christian Arabs, with the active assistance of the Greek-Catholic clergy, merged in 1951 with the "Labour League."

CONCLUSION

The above summary cannot in the nature of things convey more than a transient picture. The position of the Arab minority in Israel has not yet fully crystallised. The aftermath of war, expressed in the maintenance of a military governorate in certain border zones, still awaits liquidation. Numbers of Arabs are returning to Israel under the scheme for the reunion of separated families. Others are leaving Israel to take up residence in one of the neighbouring countries or overseas. A certain measure of Arab emigration is likely to continue for some time, hailing mainly from those social strata which, as described above, cannot hope to be gainfully integrated in the economy of Israel. Any larger immigration of Arabs into Israel is ruled out by the facts of the economic and security situation. Since the Arab exodus, the country has absorbed over 700,000 Jewish immi-

grants, of whom about 250,000 came from Arab countries, most of them in destitute condition.

The normalisation of the position of the Arab minority within Israel will undoubtedly take time. Towards that integration the Government and people of Israel, including the Arab minority itself, will have patiently and consciously to strive. The process is seriously hampered by the intransigent attitude and active hostility of the Arab Governments and their Palestinian collaborators. The same political groups which stirred up the suicidal war against Israel, which induced the mass of the Arab population to leave the country by promises of an early victory and rich booty, which are obstructing an effective settlement of the Arab refugee problem by refusing an agreed peace settlement with Israel—these same groups are also preventing those Arabs who chose to remain in Israel and have been accepted as its rightful citizens from settling down under the new conditions. It is only when this hostility and tension have become things of the past that there can be an effective integration of the Arab minority in the State of Israel.